Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy and Global Security (report)

Canadian Pugwash Group and Science for Peace Joint Annual Forum
Friday, 27 October 2006, Toronto, Canada.

Rapporteur: Metta Spencer

Working Group Rapporteurs: Cameron David Harrington, Steacy Henry

Our day consisted of four lectures by expert members of both organizations, each one followed by questions from the audience, plus three break-out discussion groups on the same topics, and then a lecture and question period by Mr. Claude Le Blanc, Acting Director General Policy and Planning with the Department of Defence. This document summarizes all these discussions.

Walter Dorn: “Afghanistan, Peacekeeping and the Canadian Forces”

After the shocking events of September 11, 2001 Dorn anticipated that the US would attack Afghanistan. He believed that the best role for Canada would be to moderate the US response. In retrospect, he believes that Canada did not moderate, but rather encouraged the United States. His analysis of Canadian policies toward Afghanistan reflects a typology depicting three categories: the hawk, the dove, and the owl.

The hawks’ view is simplistic: “freedom vs. the Taliban.” This polarizes and dehumanizes a complex world, allowing extremists to predominate on both sides. Hawks insist that we must “stay the course” to honor those who have died already. They view the world as black and white, with explicit enemies and implicit allies. This perspective is a self-fulfilling prophecy that creates more enemies than it destroys — even inside Canada, where such enemies are bringing violence to our own cities.

The doves’ view is quite different: They want to “abandon the course,” which would now mean abandoning Afghanistan. They see needless Canadian deaths there and urge withdrawal. But there are dangers in this approach, as happened in the 1980s when the Soviet Union switched policies under Gorbachev, withdrawing from Afghanistan and leaving a vacuum.

The owls’ view: neither stay nor abandon the course, but change it. This approach is complicated but not incomprehensible.

Dorn proposes the “Ten Percent Solution.” In Kandahar, ninety percent of Canada’s effort is going into combat. The money flows through corrupt hands. Instead, we need to allocate ten percent to combat and ninety percent to reconstruction.

How? By creating zones of peace. We had a good working model in Kabul, and should have expanded out slowly to show that the Kabul model will work elsewhere. We should withdraw somewhat from Kandahar to allow for longer-term success, deploying into areas where there is more receptivity. Leave some areas ungoverned until the people there are convinced that they want to belong.

Question and Answer Period:

Question: Explain, please, how Canadian forces became so heavily in combat role? Dorn: The watershed year was 1996. The Canadian forces are now in a historic low in our contribution to peacekeeping. We contribute only 55 soldiers today. Canada has now slid to 59th position, due to bad experiences with UN, where insufficient resources were provided. UNPROFOR left a bad taste in soldiers’ mouths because they couldn’t protect anyone. Hillier was influenced by the United States. Question: You didn’t explain the US’s interest in Afghanistan as the oil pipeline. Don’t we have to be talking about that in any solution?

Dorn: Oil is not part of the Canadian strategy. Now the objective is to find an exit strategy. Securing oil is not predominant part of the discussion at present.

Erika Simpson: “Implications for Canada of the US National Security Strategy”

The reliance on preventive war is a great threat, which I will discuss here. Bush promulgated the doctrine in 2002, stating that “America will act against emerging threats before they are fully formed,” and that it is “dangerous to rely on a reactive strategy.” When the US focus is on homeland security and ways of protecting the US, this has implications for Canada. Are we going to contribute to BMD in order to have a “seat at the table”?

The US government was heavily criticized for the Nuclear Policy Review, but they re-issued it. Despite learning that this strategy is problematic, they are continuing on that course.

Recall the history of deterrence. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was followed by ideas of flexible response. When the US learned that MAD lacked credibility, President Kennedy advocated flexible response instead. And today the US says it is their right to strike first, possibly using nuclear weapons. Actually the United States has contemplated preemptive actions before, as during the Cuban Missile crisis. However, the two Kennedy brothers decided that, even if advisers wanted them to do so, in the end they would not allow nuclear weapons to be used.

The US also considered preemptive action in Korea — and they are not alone. Russia and France also have notions of preemption.

There are many nonmilitary instruments of foreign policy. We should explore, e.g.,diplomatic pressure, formal letters of protest, and legal instruments, including international law. We can promote nonmilitary ideas, and can cite cases of international law that have been successful. There are dozens of non-military instruments that are short of nuclear war.

We need to be concerned about NATO’s deterrence strategy. Lloyd Axworthy tried to change their strategic concept but failed. The alliance reaffirmed the need for nuclear weapons. The US is spending $550 billion on its own defence. With the Reliable Replacement Warhead program they are modernizing their nuclear weapons. As General Lee Butler says, they have rejected deterrence in favor of a new form of war-fighting.

Question and answer period:

Question: For thirty years I’ve heard about Canadians wanting a “seat at the table.” Yet you also point out that any decision about preemptive strikes would be made by a small number of people — and Canada would not be at the table. That shows the need for a different policy in Canada.

Simpson: Yes, and Germany has nukes on its territory, but they also want a seat at the table on the planning group.

Michael Wallace: “Iran, North Korea and Proliferation: Fact, Fiction, and Politics”

That Warhead Replacement Program is only a make-work project for the three nuclear labs.

If the House goes Democrat in the imminent election, they will not fund it. Nuclear weapons and delivery systems in Iran and North Korea (DPRK) are not mature, but in the long term will pose a number of threats. The real dangers have been ignored. A military response to these dangers will be counterproductive.

The DPRK nuclear test yielded far below the explosive power expected for a plutonium weapon. There are four possible reasons: 1) Just a complete failure to develop a correct explosive. 2) Maybe they tried to skip a step, seeking to get a much smaller chemical explosion. 3) Maybe they were conserving precious plutonium. 4) Or maybe politics overrode engineering, with the dear leader ordering the engineers to make something go bang now, whether it was ready or not.

Iran is far from able to produce a bomb. They have tested centrifuges and have enriched a few kg of uranium but it’s not reactive grade. Some scientists believe they have used material given them by China. To get a bomb their way, they’d have to increase their production of uranium hexachloraflouride, which they cannot do in a short time. DPRK has good Soviet scud missiles, which are terror weapons only. They have an estimated 200 missiles with 1000 km range, which could reach Japan, but their accuracy is poor. For accuracy they must give the rocket a spin to keep it on course. It is not clear that DPRK or Iran has developed that spin technology. The DPRK has launched two long-range missile but they have failed.

Thus the capability of DPRK and Iran is not clear. Because Iran now has a rocket with the theoretical possibility of reaching Israel, the topic has become political debate, generating more heat than light. It is silly to panic about one DPRK missile, but there are real risks in proliferation. For example, it takes a state a while to recognize that they need a command and control that is separate from the ordinary command and control. Because of their uncertainty, both sides tend to inflate their assessments of the other side, resulting in saber rattling and acts of violence, possibly such as the attack on the Osiris reactor. Now the fear is about potential arms, which could lead to conflict. And proliferation is contagious; the United States and the Soviet Union were responsible for China, China for India, etc. The number of pair-wise possible conflicts goes up very rapidly as new countries join the nuclear club.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty was brought in to deal with that. From the outset it was criticized as creating a twoclass international system, with resentment on the part of some states. Article VI did not deal with that effectively. After the treaty was signed, the combined number of nuclear weapons of nuclear states increased by a factor of ten. In 2000 there were attempts to improve the original NPT – notably with explicit negative security guarantees. There were 13 practical steps, but this progress was reversed by 9/11 and the Nuclear Policy Review. The NPT only addresses the symptoms rather than the root causes. Negative security assurances applying only to nuclear weapons are not sufficient. If a power retains the right to use overwhelming conventional weapons against proliferators, that will not stop them. Iran should be offered security against any attack, conventional or nuclear, if it abstains from developing nuclear weapons.

Hans Blix says the critical place to start is with the CTBT, which doesn’t discriminate against any country. It chokes off nuclear development for, if you can’t test, you can’t deploy. It is completely enforceable without intrusion. And this treaty is in the US interest. If you are far ahead of the whole pack, a freeze in place is in your advantage.

Canada supports the CTBT in the First Committee. The Canadian government should round up consensus for it and hope that things will look better after Nov. 7. If the US senate goes Democrat, maybe the CTBT issue can be raised once again. Among our brethren in the US, we should promote putting that at the top of the agenda.

Question and answer period:

Question: Where does China stand with regard to the CTBT?

Wallace: China has agreed to a de facto moratorium, which has been observed by all the declared nuclear powers, though not by Pakistan. China was upset by the DPRK test because it creates problems for them. They don’t want a collapse of DPRK. They will be ready to test new MIRV warhead designs that they want to put in place if the moratorium breaks down. It is important then to get the CTBT codified as a piece of international law.

Peter Langille: “Darfur and the UN Emergency Force”

The international community has not made progress re:

a) genocide and gross violations of human rights. (Darfur disillusions everyone.) b) preventing armed conflict. (It can save millions of lives and billions of dollars.) c) protecting civilians at risk. (Responsibility to Protect was endorsed by General Assembly and the Security Council. Some UN mandates already include protection of civilians but few are up to the task. Now we have major operational challenges.) d) rapid deployment. (The UN system is slow; reforms have done very little. There is a pattern of routine delays. When resources are not available it takes four to five months to put troops on the ground because the UN must borrow troops from governments. Few UN missions can do the job in a high risk environment.)

These are the big challenges. We could hold our governments to their obligations. The UN is blamed for a lot but without help from the member states, nothing works to address these challenges. All are stand-by arrangements,

relying on member governments, but we need a more ambitious option. The best improvement may be this: a UN Emergency Peace Service.

We have heard that any proposal for a standing UN force has no chance of being realized. The UN Emergency Service has a broader base for support, however; it may be a tougher concept for politicians to oppose. People tend to appreciate the kind of services it could provide, such as police. It would be a permanent UN formation, maintained for immediate deployment upon authorization by the UN Security Council. There would be about 15,000 competent professionals in a single UN base with two field headquarters.

Deployable elements:

a) Civilian elements: Small teams that provide big services: environmental crisis teams, disaster relief, etc. b) Robust military brigade. This is simply for a first response – a dedicated UN service, designed to complement existing arrangements.

Who would volunteer to join such a UN service? There would be many paid volunteers, drawn on the basis of universal representation.

WORKING GROUP 1: AFGHANISTAN, UN PEACEKEEPING AND THE CANADIAN FORCES

The conversation explored Walter Dorn’s proposal. He began by reminding us that it differs markedly from what Canada is now doing. The objective would be defence, not offence. There would be military expansion, but with elements of peacekeeping.

There was considerable controversy in the group about how much military force will continue to be needed in Afghanistan. This involved comparisons with similar historical cases. There was one comment, for example, that portrayed this approach as parallel to the “strategic villages” approach in Vietnam, which was disastrous. These “zones of peace” were seen as islands that relied on the corrupt government of South Vietnam, which was supported by the United States. But, Dorn replied, the problem in Vietnam was that there was too much of an aggressive edge, which invited retaliation.

There were other comparisons made to Guatemala and the Congo. In Guatemala, a number of peace villages emerged that declared themselves to be on neither side of the conflict. They announced that they would not harbour soldiers on either side. Some of them were bombed by the government for declaring neutrality. A few were successful, others not.

The first participant expressed doubt that force could be reduced as much as Dorn and other participants wanted. In the Congo, he said, the French went in, proclaimed the existence of a “weapon free zone,” and suppressed the violence. But in Afghanistan, how can you control the suicide bombers? Dorn replied: Only by winning the hearts and minds of the people, who will inform you about suicide bombers.

More doubts were expressed: How can you win hearts and minds after all this violence? NATO just killed 70 people in one single recent bombing raid.

Dorn replied: We would have to apologize and withdraw slowly from Kandahar. It will be embarrassing for the hawks, but it is the only way.

Yet another comparison was made: this time to Malaya, where the British once conducted a successful counterinsurgency. The struggle lasted twelve years. In the early phases, they made many mistakes by using overwhelming force. Their success came later, when they took a paramilitary, rather than military, approach. They were more like police, with people walking the beat and using intelligence and only a minimum of necessary force. Walter Dorn agreed with this model. He added that the last rebels did not give up until the 1980s. The important thing, though, was that Britain granted independence to Malaya. They were able to start winning hearts and minds with “soft touch sanctions.” They didn’t starve people, but just made life more difficult for them. They frisked grannies for weapons, for example. He says this is the right approach in Afghanistan today. There was a discussion of the proposals of Siddiq Weera, an Afghan physician who has been urging Canada to return to a peacekeeping, policing role, protecting civilians in cities while also organizing negotiations with the Taliban and warlords. This model seems to have much in common with Walter Dorn’s suggestions. It is an idea that Sergei Plekhanov, York University, (also a CPG member) has also been promoting. Yet there were still expressions of misgivings in the group. For example, the first participant said us that when the UN mission took a traditional reactive approach in the Congo, it was a failure. Violence spiraled and overwhelmed their ability to police the situation. There’s some danger in going too far when shifting to the soft approach, he insisted. We may not want to cede the entire countryside because that will give power to the Taliban and the warlords. The cities might lose access to food crops.

Walter Dorn conceded that it is unclear how large the zones of peace should be. That’s a scientific calculation to work out. There could, indeed, be some attacks on the cities. Still, the idea of establishing protected areas goes back to the British, who said that sometimes it’s not feasible to carry on administration everywhere. In some places you have to cede power to local leaders.

Another particpant argued that Afghans have to make Afghanistan for themselves. Their government still does not have complete legitimacy. The Pashtuns remain the base of the Taliban, who were simply thrown out of power, much as the Baathists were thrown out of power in Iraq. This creates a problem of legitimacy. Only two weeks ago did NATO give a green light to Pakistan to negotiate with the Taliban. Karzai is a Pashtun, but he’s viewed as an American; therefore, the Taliban boycotted the election. The solution is, as Siddiq Weera has suggested: create something that is truly representative. This can only be done through a real peace process with all the important forces sitting at the table. Hold a Loya Jirga to determine who will sit at the table.

There are also important forces to pay attention to outside the country—obviously most of all in Pakistan. The Pashtuns are a divided nation. The treaty that settled the border between them has expired, so Pakistan’s government cannot use much force against the Taliban. It’s militarily impossible. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the neighbors into the discussion too. NATO doesn’t want to deal with Iran with regard to Afghanistan, but all the neighbors have constituencies inside Afghanistan and their voice must be heard.

WORKING GROUPS 2 & 4: NUCLEAR ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CANADIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY

Groups two and four combined to discuss American security strategies as well as nuclear proliferation issues, particularly North Korea and Iran.

There was much useful discussion and debate among representatives of the Canadian Pugwash Group (CPG), Science for Peace (SfP), the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (CNANW) and Lawyers for Social Responsibility about how their organizations could uniquely contribute to Canada’s response. The report on this Working Group was prepared separately and was delivered to the officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The reports was completed for consideration by the NATO Policy Conference in Quebec City, November 2006, but was not considered – the reason given was timing. This report may be viewed by clicking here.

WORKING GROUP 3: CREATING A UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY PEACE SERVICE (UNEPS)

It is hoped that this discussion will identify possible ways to enhance co-operation between organizations in support of the global initiative for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UN EPS). Awareness of the proposed UN EPS can and should be moved throughout Canada with a more concentrated and serious manner than has been done to date. This one innovation was designed to prevent armed conflict (including genocide and gross violations of human rights), to protect civilians at risk, to ensure rapid deployment to UN peace operations and to address human needs in areas of high-risk. Notably, as a `lead service’ or `first responder’, UN EPS also complements existing UN, national and regional arrangements.

Several related norms and wider objectives were endorsed by the General Assembly at the World Summit last September, and by the Security Council last winter. Yet tangible progress has been elusive, with responses, which are frequently caricatured as `too little’, `too-late’ or `too lame’.

In short, both the UN and `we the peoples’ need a dedicated, legitimate UN mechanism to prevent, protect and when necessary, react.

The development of a UN EPS is no longer `mission-impossible’. Earlier polls indicated 78% of Canadians were strongly in favour of a standing UN rapid reaction force. Elsewhere the idea is attracting unique support. And, in the U.S. there has not only been a remarkable surge in public support for a more effective UN, UN EPS is already on the legislative agenda as an Act before the US House of Representatives. Given the evident shifts in attitudes and priorities now occurring, UN EPS is increasingly deemed to be a more appealing concept, a more appropriate model, and with far more political potential. Following numerous reviews, this proposed service is also viewed as far more reliable, rapid and cost-effective. UN EPS has been referred to as a `UN 911’; a key element in the “universal project of last century” and the “cosmopolitan project of this century”. Rather than await the next tragedy, the key challenge now is to ensure supportive parties are adequately prepared for 2007-08.

Additional endorsements are needed. Assistance with ongoing global outreach efforts would be very helpful. It is only through organizational co-operation and support that a decent idea has the potential to mobilize people and influence governments.

Questions were raised within the group about national sovereignty and the internal contradiction present in the UN Charter that guarantees the right of national sovereignty to member states while simultaneously endorsing the doctrine of the responsibility to protect. Questions were answered through discussion pertaining to the evergrowing interdependence being seen today in the world; few states can claim any control over the world’s economic, security, or environmental issues with present trends of globalization continuing. September 11th highlighted that even the most powerful states are vulnerable, and imminent challenges such as accelerated global warming and the certainty of an avian flu pandemic will require substantive changes to be made by the international community. For all of these reasons, national sovereignty appears to be on the decline. Our society is inevitably becoming a global one. Institutions such as the ICC are necessary mechanisms for advancing and enforcing international law.

The USA seems to be going in the opposite direction. How can we get the US to support UN EPS? The Bush Administration is failing in taking this direction. If the Republicans lose control of the House, control over the domestic political agenda will likely be lost, creating space for new political options. The US is currently losing the war in Iraq — with a financial cost in the trillions. Canada has chosen a Conservative government at a time when the rest of the world is seriously questioning the neo-conservative. There is a basis for UN EPS active in US drafted legislation. Several US congressmen have expressed support for UN EPS, 20 large organizations with global outreach are on side but a greater support base is needed in Canada before the Canadian government can be contacted for their support.

Is UN EPS gender inclusive? Yes. The UN EPS model includes gender awareness teams and is designed to be a gender-equity service.

In Ottawa, the Civilian Peace Service of Canada has held two conferences to look at what kind of standards would be required in developing a civilian peace service for Canada. This initiative is compatible with UN EPS but UN EPS is more designed for emergency services where there is an urgent imminent need. This is why a military element is required for UN EPS because it is too risky to send civilian peacekeeping volunteers into situations of such high risk. Many UN failures have been the result of not having adequate security on the ground. When facing warlords and heavily armed militants a military component is necessary. Protections from situations like genocide require at least minimal levels of force.

It was raised here that words such as `force’ and `military’ should be avoided when speaking about this proposal. This point was agreed on and it was pointed out that this was the reasoning behind UN EPS being labeled `emergency service’. Being conscious of the need to impress the public and generate an appealing proposal is important. Words such as `military’ and `force’ should not be emphasized; UN EPS should be seen as complementary to national forces and not in any way as competing with them. UN EPS is critical in ensuring a good start to mission commencement; designed to deal with the worst-case scenarios where NGOs can’t or won’t 12 go in and /or when political will is absent. The UN tends to do too little, too late which leads to larger problems down the road when conflicts spread further and aren’t contained. For these reasons UN EPS is cost-effective. Start up cost of 2 billion dollars is estimated to be required, plus 1 billion annual cost, but the need for peacekeeping missions would be decreased because awareness of UN EPS would deter warlords and other primary leaders of conflict.

A global network consisting of strong partnerships needs to be developed. As a model of success, we are seeing unprecedented changes in regard to the landmines treaty; political priorities are beginning to shift; organizations are mobilizing.

How can UNEPS be encouraged and generate broader organizational awareness?

  • More outreach is needed; lectures at universities and high schools, conferences
  • Generate pre-recruitment strategies
  • Build a broader constituency support base in Canada
  • Make use of media / free media- TV, radio, internet-internet can be specifically useful in tailoring UN EPS to certain groups and is also cost-effective; create distinct materials for high schools, university students, professional communities and clubs – make materials packaged in a way that appeals to youth
  • Link with concept of responsibility to protect as much as possible
  • Engage the public and gain support of prominent figures
  • Greater co-ordination between organizations in Canada working on similar causes such as the Department for Peace project and the Participatory Democracy in Urban Areas project. This organization is currently working on peace issues and wants to hold a peace summit. A lecture at this summit could be about UN EPS and the link between urban and global health.

Claude Le Blanc, Acting Director General of Policy Planning, “Canada’s Defence Policy”

There is no conventional military threat to Canada, but there are global terrorism; failed states, weapons of mass destruction, and regional flashpoints.

There have been changes in Canadian defence policy under the Conservative government:

a) A “Canada first” orientation, with new “territorial battalions” to respond to emergencies in major urban areas. Also may enhance the formation of rapid reaction forces.

13 b) Greater focus on Arctic security and sovereignty. Maritime and air traffic, illegal entry of people and goods; environmental concerns, increased demand for search and rescue, organized crime; sovereignty issues. c) Strengthening the Canada-US defence relationship d) Engage abroad, with additional troops, tanks and equipment to Afghanistan to support the 2000+ personnel there. e) Staying the course in Afghanistan. Part of international effort with DFAIT, CIDA, civilian police, corrections Canada, and a provincial reconstruction team. f) Budget. The FY 2006-7 defence budget will be about $15.2 B. g) Canadian Forces expansion. Government has pledged to grow the forces by 13,000 regulars, 10,000 reserves. New defence strategy document will be released in the fall, formalizing a long term capital acquisition plan.

Question and Answer Period

Question: What are the provisions for defending nuclear power stations in Canada? They need special attention.

LeBlanc: There are contingency plans, working with department of public safety. Question: When our forces went to Afghanistan, we were told there were 300 – 500 insurgents. In Medusa, we were told 1000 insurgents were killed. How many are there??

Le Blanc: I don’t know. A lot of the insurgents are launching from Pakistan. Some insurgents have left Iraq, have come to Afghanistan. Our military will probably be in Afghanistan in 2009. We will pull out, probably, if the other countries do so.

Question: The defence expenditure is increasing. Why then the cutbacks in DFAIT, etc.? LeBlanc: Our budgets went down in the early 1990s by about $13 billion. It was part of the peace dividend. We are not spending much on our military compared to our allies. The NATO average is two percent. We’re only ahead of Luxembourg.

Question: Why is Darfur not high priority? Why does it make sense to expand to engage in emergencies down the road, but ignore one that exists now?

LeBlanc: I have the same questions. One reason why we’ve been constrained in contemplating a second deployment is that we need training sessions back at home.

Question: Norway and Sweden have offered troops.

LeBlanc: You’re right. The government has decided to make Afghanistan its own.

Question: Is the SHERBRIG lower priority in this government?

Le Blanc: I think you may be right.

Question: We are less engaged everywhere except in Afghanistan. You don’t even call them peacekeeping operations – you call them stability operations. It has become radically different. Le Blanc: The definition of peacekeeping has evolved. Just because we’re not under the UN hat doesn’t mean that we’re not doing peacekeeping. Other countries are doing the same thing. We can only deploy so many people with forces numbering 60,000, but it would take a long time to explain why. The nature of peacekeeping has evolved. We don’t have operations like in Cyprus anymore. If the Canadian Forces go into Darfur, we wouldn’t go without the ability to protect ourselves. In Afghanistan, the government has accepted the international presence, but in Sudan, the UN will not be welcome. Not only will the militia shoot at us, but the government may do so. It is going to be dangerous. If we want to deliver aid and development there, we will have to establish a secure environment.

Question: What are you going to do with nuclear weapons? If the nuclear weapons states get into an exchange, we’d have nuclear winter.

LeBlanc: Our concern is with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There have been some reductions in nuclear weapons across the world. The Canadian government policy is: promoting disarmament within the context of an evolving security environment. We are concerned about Iran and Korea, where the governments might have plans to use them.

Question: Without controlling vertical proliferation, you’ll never control horizontal proliferation. Le Blanc: The Russians and American have agreed to reverse their nuclear weapons development. We have made some progress in that particular environment. On the other hand, we have countries that want to acquire their own nuclear weapons.

Question: What our political leaders — Liberals and Conservatives — allow themselves to consider peacemaking was really war-fighting. This is not acceptable.

Question: Money is going to be spent on things we need in Afghanistan. Is it going to be spent on the kind of equipment we need in the long term?

LeBlanc: When an event develops abroad, we bring together national defence, foreign affairs and CIDA and try to determine how best to respond to those events. If we can do it with humanitarian assistance, we do so. This government remains committed to trying to resolve problems by diplomatic means. Invading Iran or Korea is off the map for us. There’s no trend here.

Question: The fine line between peacemaking and war-fighting have been blurred in the last 13 months. It’s now war-fighting going on. I don’t think this is what Canadian voters want.

LeBlanc: There is no denying that war is taking place in Afghanistan.

Proposed Policy Directions for the Government of Canada

The essential elements of proposed policy directions, by the presenters, or within the Working Groups, are briefly summarized below. Please refer to earlier parts of this report for details.

Afghanistan and the Canadian Forces (W. Dorn and WG1)

  • Canada’s effort is disproportionately directed toward combat. Instead, allocate the major proportion of effort to reconstruction.
  • Create zones of peace, taking Kabul as a working model and expanding outward, and having regard to the need of Afghans to run their own affairs.
  • Neighbouring countries have constituencies inside Afghanistan and achieving peace requires their voices

Nuclear Issues: Global Security Problems (E. Simpson, M.Wallace and WG)

  • The Canadian government must strengthen its commitment to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
  • Canada must fully commit to support of the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
  • Canada must give priority to urging the U.S. and Russia to de-alert their tactical nuclear weapons
  • Canada should support the New Agenda Coalition and work with its member countries to persuade nuclear weapons states to move decisively towards disarmament
  • It is imperative to resolve the continued incompatibility between NATO’s nuclear policy and the NPT regime, under which Canada supports the “unequivocal undertaking” for total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Creating a United Nations Emergency Force(UN EPS) (P. Langille and WG3)

  • The development of a UN EPS has received significant public support, and should be seen as complementary to national forces, not in competition with them.
  • Canada should encourage the UN to move forward on creation of a rapid deployment force as it has the potential for limiting the spread of conflict and providing vital services such as policing, in a relatively economical form.
  • The lack of a service such as the UN EPS could have contributed to the worsening situation of gross violations of human rights in Darfur. Canada’s contribution to resolving this crisis is insufficient.